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Abstract
This paper developes a small open economy model in which domestic resource shocks
play a vital role in driving the dynamics of the major macroeconomic aggregates. House-
holds rent capital and labour to rms and have access to an international bond market. The
model is calibrated to recent Icelandic data and simulated under two alternative exchange
rate regimes: oating rates, and monetary union membership. It is found that by entering
a larger currency area, the volatility of the real exchange rate, real wages and consumption
are sharply reduced, but output and employment are seen to be more volatile. Smoother
consumption renders monetary union marginally Pareto superior to oating. Under mon-
etary union and low ination, slight nominal wage reductions may be required at times to
absorb adverse resource shocks. [JEL Codes: E32, E42, F31, F41. Key words: domestic
resource shocks, exchange rate regime, stabilization, welfare costs.]
* Professor, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Iceland, Reykjavik, Iceland,
email: tor@hi.is
1
1. Introduction
In his paper on optimal currency areas, Robert Mundell (1961) proposed several condi-
tions under which a monetary union between two or more regions would dene a feasible
regime of exhange rates. First, factors of production, capital and labour, should be highly
mobile across regions. With one region facing an adverse demand shock, say, moving fac-
tors from that region would bring markets back into equilibrium. Second, macroeconomic
shocks should be synchronized, i.e. a shock hitting one region should hit other regions in
same direction. Third, nominal factor prices, including wages, should be exible, in order
to restore equilibrium in the factor markets after a shock. For a currency area to function
smoothly, at least one of these conditons should be met. This general proposition has been
applied at the national level, bringing up the issue whether a particular economy is suit-
able for joining a larger currency area, of which the European Monetary Union (EMU) is a
recent example. Several advantages have been listed from joining such a union. First, the
reduction of transaction costs that are incurred in exchanging from one currency to another.
Second, the elimination of exchange rate risk, reducing real interest rate uncertainty, and
in turn, the accompanying premium. Third, more transparity in prices across countries.
These eects are likely to improve market eciency in general, enhancing economic activity
and growth. Among the disadvantages from entering a monetary union are: rst, a loss of
a degree of freedom, the nominal exchange rate, as a means of reacting to macroeconomic
shocks. Second, the surrender of national sovereignty, as the monetary authority no longer
conducts an independent monetary policy.
Since the emergence of EMU, there has been an ongoing debate in Iceland whether or not
to join, mostly in the general media. However, some scholarly contributions have also been
made. Buiter (2000) compares the late 1990's regime of price stability (coupled with a fairly
exible exchange rate) adopted in Iceland and monetary union membership. He concludes
that, on balance, neither regime overwhelmingly dominates the other. The lack of real factor
mobility and nominal price rigidities would not be major obstacles to EMU membership,
but the current arrangement might provide better macroeconomic stabilization in face of
temporary real shocks. Gudmundsson et.al. (2000) conclude rather in favour of exible
exchange rates, arguing that neither is trade with the EMU area extensive enough nor are
transaction costs large enough to outweigh the costs of giving up the Icelandic currency,
krona. With the main source of uctuations being rooted in domestic supply shocks (to
sh catch in particular), and wages and labour being inexible, entering a larger currency
area, such as the EMU, is not a feasible option. Agnarsson et.al. (2000) conclude that
adopting the euro currency would limit the Icelandic economy's ability to absorb adverse
supply shocks, at least on the scale seen in the past. However, they point out the potential
for more monetary discipline from EMU membership, which might contribute to more
exibility in the labour market.
This paper focuses on the suitability of alternative exchange rate regimes in Iceland,
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from the viewpoint of macroeconomic stability. To that end we develop a simple small open
economy model that builds on the real business cycle (RBC) literature. Early examples
of such modelling include Cardia (1991) and Mendoza (1991) (single consumer good), and
Einarsson (1992) (two consumer goods). These studies focus on certain statistics pertaining
to open economies, such as the current account and the correlation between savings and
investment, under some given exchange rate regime, typically xed rates. Among more
recent examples is Fernandez and Kehoe (2000), who develope a model with one traded
and one nontraded good to examine the eects of Spain's abolition of capital controls in
the late 1980's and early 1990's. Cooley and Quadranini (2001) develop a model with one
home produced and one imported intermediate good and compare the welfare implications
of adopting the U.S. dollar in the Mexican economy to monetary independence. They
conclude that a `dollarization' may not be Pareto superior to an independent monetary
policy. Mendoza (2001) formulates a model with a traded and a nontraded good, with
households facing a potential borrowing constraint in an international bond market. He
concludes that `dollarization' may entail signicant welfare benets for emerging economies
such as Mexico's: rst, by eliminating price and wealth distortions induced by the lack of
credible stabilization policies; second, by improving the eciency of nancial markets by
reducing frictions originating in information structure or institutions. Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2001) consider a small open economy model with households who have access to an
international bond market. Two types of goods are produced, exportables and nontrade-
ables, and three goods are absorbed, exportables, importables, and nontradeables. Two
sources of nominal rigidities are assumed: `sticky' prices of nontradeables, and transaction
costs that are decreasing in households' money balances. Calibrating the model to Mexican
quarterly data, it is found that `dollarization' is Pareto inferior to the alternative regimes
examined, including constant money growth and ination targeting.
In the model constructed here, households consume two goods, a home good and a for-
eign good, both being tradeable and imperfect substitutes for one another. Total spending
on consumption is constrained by the amount of money balances carried over from the
previous period, a standard cash-in-advance constraint. This motivates households to hold
money balances on grounds of liquidity services. The households undertake all investment
in physical capital, which is rented out to the rms, along with labour services. Households
also have access to an international bond market, onto which they can channel savings
(or incur debt). There are two production sectors in the model. One producing a single
non-sh output that can be used for consumption and investment at home, or exported.
Another sector, the sheries sector, transforms an exogenously given sh catch into an
exportable good, sheries exports.
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Two regimes on exchange rates are considered: a
oating or exible rates, and a monetary union membership, a form of a credible currency
peg. While neither case fully matches the historical regime (or the regimes) adopted in
1
For an other example in which a product serves as an exportable only, see e.g Conzaga and Terra
(1997).
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Iceland, we take the oating rate case to be the closer approximation. Calibrating the
model to recent Icelandic data indicates that entering a monetary union will tend to sta-
bilize some macroeconomic quantities and destabilize others. Among the former are the
real exchange rate, real wages and consumption. In the latter category we have output and
employment. Therefore, the model provides no reason to expect `across the board' stabi-
lization from switching between exchange rate regimes. However, concerning the welfare
costs of business cycles in Iceland, it is found that with lower volatility of both consumer
goods, monetary union membership marginally dominates oating exchange rates.
The model is set out in Section 2. The calibration is described in Section 3, and the
simulation exercies are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The Model
The model consists of ve sectors: households, non-sh producers, a sheries sector,
a foreign sector, and a monetary authority. Households rent capital and labour services
to the non-sh producers, and purchase two types of consumer goods, one domestic, one
foreign. They hold three types of assets: physical capital, foreign bonds, and money. The
expenditure on the two consumption goods is constrained by a standard cash-in-advance
constraint. The non-sheries sector produces a single output which can be consumed,
invested in physical capital, or exported. The sheries sector transforms sh catch into a
good that is solely used for exports. Two exchange rate regimes are assumed in the model:
a oating rate, and a permanent peg to the foreign currency. There are three sources of
aggregate shocks in the model: one to total factor productivity, one to sh catch, and one
to export demand.
2.1 Households
The representative household seeks to maximize expected life utility, or
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where period utility is derived from consuming the home and the foreign good, c
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t
, according to the utility function, U , assumed to possess
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 is the discount factor, and
E
0
the expectations operator, conditional on all period 0 information.
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The household's budget constraint is given by:
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where: P
t
is the domestic output price; E
t
is the unit price of foreign currency in terms of
home currency; k
d
t+1
is the end of period stock of capital; b
d
t+1
and M
d
t+1
are the stocks of
one period foreign bonds and money respectively, with negative values of b
t+1
amounting to
foreign debt incurred by households; n
t
denotes the amount of labour services; R
t
and W
t
are the rental rates of capital and labour respectively; R
Ft
denotes the gross interest rate
on the foreign bond; J
t
is a lumpsum transfer from the monetary authority in the case of
oating exchange rate,  = 1; in the case of monetary union, we set  = 0. By normalizing
the foreign price level to unity, we do not distinguish between real and nominal quantities
in the foreign sector.
In nominal terms, household's consumption purchases are further subjected to a stan-
dard cash-in-advance constraint:
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where M
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are the beginning of period money balances, and A
t
= J
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under oating, or
A
t
= V
t
, the balance of payments, under monetary union (see Section 2.4.)
The household allocates its time to leisure and labour services in each period:
l
t
+ n
t
 1 (4)
with total time normalized to one.
Finally, b
d
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are given.
A recursive representation
To express the maximization problem recursively, it is neccessary to convert the model
to a stationary form. To that end, we normalize all domestic nominal quantities on the
output price, P
t
. Furthermore, dropping the time subscripts, dene the following set of
normalized variables: e  EQ=P; w  W=P; m
d
0
 M
d
0
=P; j  J=P; a  A=P ,
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and   P=P
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, the gross rate of ination. The household's state vector is dened by
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ned below. The dynamic
programming problem can then be written as follows, with next period's values denoted
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The solution to the dynamic programming problem above yields the following set of
Euler-equations:
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The rst three equations show the intertemporal margins facing the households. By
reducing today's leisure time, and increasing work eort, say, the left hand sides of these
equations measure the foregone marginal utility, which is balanced against enhanced con-
sumption/leisure opportunities tomorrow, from investing the additional labour income in
capital, (eq. (9)), foreign bonds, (eq.(10)), or money balances, (eq.(11)). The last equation
denes the intratemporal margin between the domestic and the foreign consumer good,
with the marginal rate of substitution equated to the relative price, the real exchange rate.
2.2 Firms
The non-sheries sector consists of perfectly competitive industry that is modelled by
a single aggregative rm. That rm uses capital and labour in its production process. The
sheries sector has access to a renewable resource, a homogeneous shing stock, whose
period catch is assumed exogenous and subject to a stochastic process. To keep matters as
simple as possible, we further assume that these two sectors can be dened in terms of an
aggregator function, whereby total output is dependent on capital, labour, sh catch, and
a general shock to productivity:
max
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where F is the production function, which is continouously dierentiable concave, and
linearly homogeneous in the pair (K;N); K and N are the aggregate per capita amounts
of capital and employment respectively; H is the sheries sector production technology,
assumed linear; 
D
is a shock to sh catch; and 
G
is a total factor productivity shock.
The maximization of (13) yields the following standard static rst order conditions:
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F
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where the marginal products of the two factors are equated to their rental rates.
2.3 The monetary authority
Under the regime of a oating exchange rate, the monetary authority has the option of
conducting an independent policy rule, which may or may not be state dependent:
M
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(16)
where S = (b; k;m; 
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) is the aggregate state vector, and 
F
is a shock to non-sh
export demand, whose role is described in more detail below.
Any increment to the money stock is passed on to households as a transfer:
M
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= M
t
+ J
t
Under currency peg, the stock of nominal balances evolves according to the balance of
payments (see below).
2.4 The balance of payments
Let V
t
denote the balance of payments in nominal terms:
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or, in a normalized form:
v = X(
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where X denes a demand function for non-sh exports;
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eH(
D
) is the value of sheries
exports; and ec
F
is the spending on the imported consumer good, both in terms of domestic
output. In sum, the rst three terms dene the trade balance, while the last two register
the capital account vis-à-vis the foreign economy.
2.5 Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium of the model is dened in a standard manner.
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Included are the following equilibrium conditions:
Output market equilibrium:
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We note that X can be viewed as an analogue to an inverted form of equation (13); namely c
F
=
	(c
D
; e), with 	
1
> 0, and 	
1
< 0 . Reciprocally, by dening such a function for the foreign sector
we obtain X(
F
; e), with X
1
; X
2
> 0, where 
F
is exogenously given and stochastic. The exact nature
of 
F
is left unspecied here. It can be thought of as a foreign consumer response to a productivity
shock; alternatively, it can be taken as a taste shock. This shock belongs to the category of terms-of-trade
shocks, whose importance for open economies, especially emerging economies in Latin America, has been
emphasized by Del Negro and Obiols-Homs (2001), and Mendoza (1995).
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In brief, it can be stated by dening: a set of household decision rules; a set of aggregate decision rules;
the aggregate laws of motion governing the evolution of the endogenous state variables; the laws of motion
of the exogenous state variables; the set of output and factor pricing functions; and the value function that
satisfy (5) and the equilibrium conditions in the markets for output, capital, labour, foreign exchange, and
money.
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Money market equilibrium:
(i) oating
m
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(ii) monetary union
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Note that in the case of monetary union, where E can be normalized to one without
loss of generality, the domestic output price, P , and the real exchange rate, e, become an
inverse of one another, i.e. e = 1=P .
2.6 The model in full
After imposing the equilibrium and aggregate consistency conditions, the model consists
of the following equations:
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3. Calibration
This section describes the calibration of the model to Icelandic data. There are two
important things to notice here. First, some key macroeconomic quantities such as output,
consumption and investment are available on a quarterly basis only since 1997. That leaves
us with calibration to annual data as the only option. Second, the Icelandic economy
has undergone nontrivial secular changes in a number of areas over the last couple of
decades. One example is the gradual transition from rather strict capital controls to a
complete capital mobility across the national borders. Another example is the increased
diversication of exports, with the share of sheries products in total exports declining
from 58 % in 1980 to about 40 % in the year 2000. Lastly, experiencing persistent high
ination in the 1970's and the 1980's, the economy has entered a low to moderate ination
phase in the 1990's.
4
For these reasons, we base the calibration on the most recent state
of the economy.
The functional forms used for parameterizing the model are given below.
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For example, the consumer price index registered an annual average increase of 33 % during 1971-90,
dropping to 3.2 % in 1991-2000.
11
The period utility function is logarithmic in consumption and linear in leisure, which
amounts to assuming indivisibilities in labour services, as suggested by Hansen (1985) and
Rogerson (1988). It is well known in the real business cycle literature that assuming, e.g.
logarithmic preferences over leisure, generally yields too smooth cyclical employment.
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The general production technology is Cobb-Douglas.
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Fisheries output is linear in sh catch.
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where  is the ratio of sh to nonsh exports.
The stochastic processes are all assumed to be AR(1):
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Finally, we assume a simple ad hoc monetary rule in the case of a oating exchange
rate. According to this rule, money growth partly accommodates the domestic resource
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shock, implying more price stability than attained under, say, a constant money growth
rule:
(S
t
) = (
Dt
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Dt 1
)
0:2
;
where  is the mean gross growh rate, which we set to one.
Based on Icelandic annual data from the second half of the 1990's, we obtain average
estimates of: an investment to output ratio, I=Y , of 0.20, a capital-output ratio, K=Y , of
2.93, the capital share of output, , of 0.337, and the sh to nonsh export ratio, , of 0.84.
The value of  = 0:15 is consistent with a share of sheries of c. 13 % in the aggregator
function, F . In line with the foreign bond position in the late 1990's, we calibrate the
model around a ratio of foreign debt to output of 50 %.
The values for K=Y and I=Y are consistent with a depreciation rate, , of 0.0683. From
the steady-state version of the Euler equation for capital investment, (19), this further yields
an estimate for the discount factor,  = 0:955, which is consistent with a foreign bond rate
of interest of 4.71 %. The value of 
2
= 3:652 was obtained from the steady-state form
of equation (21), by assuming households to spend 40 % of their nonsleeping hours on
employment.
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Using data on the ratio of imports of goods and services to GDP, we obtain
a value for 
1
of 0.78.
The parameter values in stochastic processes for sh catch and foreign export demand
are based on estimated AR(1)'s from the sample period 1980-99. The autocorrelation
coecients so obtained are 
D
= 0:689 and 
F
= 0:626, and the standard errors are

D
= 0:057 and 
F
= 0:027 respectively. For the general productivity shock we simply use
the annualized Kydland-Prescott (1982) value for the autocorrelation coecient, 
G
= 0:81,
and calibrate the standard error to match the output volatility in the model with the
Icelandic data, which yields 
G
= 0:014:
4. The Results
4.1 Icelandic economy data samples
Table 1 contains some summary statistics on Icelandic macroeconomic prices and quan-
tites, based on a data sample from the period 1961-1999, divided into three subsamples:
one ranging from 1961-79, another spanning 1980-99, and nally, one from 1988-99. Of
these samples, the last comes probably closest in identifying the contemporary `Icelandic
business cycle' pattern. All data have been detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott lter.
5
Long working hours in Iceland is a well documented phenomenon. According to surveys undertaken
by the Statistical Bureau of Iceland and others, the average working week for those engaged in full-time
employment is about 50 hours.
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[Insert Table 1.]
According to Table 1, Icelandic macroeconomic aggregates have the following character-
istics. First, the volatility of output is larger than seen in a typical industrialized economy,
with a standard deviation of 4.21 per cent during 1961-99. In most OECD economies, this
statistic is in the 2 - 3 per cent range [See e.g. Gudmundsson and Zoega (2000).] Second,
consumption tends to register more volatility than output, which is by no means unique
among smaller economies [Gudmundsson and Zoega (2000).] Third, investment is three to
four times as volatile as output and highly procyclical, which is in line with observations
from a number of countries. Fourth, employment is relatively smooth, but less so in the
second half of the period. Fifth, the real exchange rate, e, is countercyclical, a tendency
which follows from the dominating role of the domestic resource shocks. A negative shock
to sh catch lowers productivity and decreases net exports, forcing a devaluation of the
domestic currency. Sixth, net exports as a ratio to output, are countercyclical, a tendency
generally shared by other economies [See e.g. Clarida (1991), Mendoza (1991), and Gud-
mundsson and Zoega (2000).] Last, but not least, output and outher quantities show a
decreasing volatility over the period, with the standard deviation of output declining from
4.81 % in 1961-79 to 3.2 % in 1988-99. An important factor in this trend is the declining
share of sheries products (highly volatile by nature) in exports. In the 1960's, this share
stood at around 65 percent; by 1999 it had dropped to 41 percent.
4.2 Model results: second moments and impulse responses
Table 2 contains second moments on some macroeconomic aggregates, based on two
model versions concerning exchange rate regime:
6
one with oating rates, the other with
a monetary union.
7
Although neither regime is seen to match the actual exchange rate
policy pursued by the Icelandic authorities since 1990 or so, we believe that taking the
period 1990-2000 as a whole, it is better be described by a oating rate regime than a
monetary union.
8
As an illustration, the basket of foreign currency, composed by the
Central Bank of Iceland, rose by 15.2 percent during 1993-94 (in response to negative
resource and other shocks), and fell by 4 percent during 1997-2000, a period of expanding
economic activity and increasing net capital inows.
9
6
The models were solved using the method of parameterized expectations, proposed by Marcet (1988)
and DenHaan and Marcet (1990).
7
In the model, we treat the foreign economy as a homogeneous entity, but it is abundantly clear that
the real world is dierent. While no presumption is made here as to which currency would be the real
world counterpart to the foreign money in the model, the present Icelandic trade pattern would suggest
the Euro as the most probable candidate.
8
For a more detailed account of the exchange rate policy in Iceland in the post-War era, see e.g Gud-
mundsson et.al. (2000).
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In eect, it can be argued that a credible currency peg, or a monetary union membership, has not
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[Insert Table 2.]
Table 2 lists the standard deviations of output, consumption, investment, employment,
the real wage, in composite consumer good units, the real exchange rate, the ratio of net
exports to output, and net foreign debt over output. The contemporaneous correlations
with output are also shown. Comparing the oating exchange rate version with the Ice-
landic data sample from 1988-99, we observe that the model does rather well in capturing
the second moments of output, investment, and employment. Consumption and real wages
are too smooth in the model, but it gets both correlations with output about right. Given
that the sample period is not characterized by clear oating, an overshooting in real ex-
change rate volatility should perhaps not come as a surprise. The dominating eects of
the domestic resource shock show up clearly in the countercyclical movements of the real
exchange rate, e. A positive shock to sh catch, 
D
, aects productivity as well as the
balance of payments. To restore equilibrium in the market for foreign exchange, the do-
mestic currency must rise, i.e. e must fall. A general productivity shock aects domestic
production in the same manner and enhances household expenditure in general. Unlike the
shock to sh catch, it has no direct eect on the current account. Hence, a rise in 
G
forces
a depreciation of the domestic currency, that is, a rise in e. A positive shock to non-sh
export demand, 
F
, acts positively on the balance of payments, and hence, negatively on
e. Under oating rates, the shock to sh catch dominates the other two in the foreign
exchange rate market. The model predicts too smooth behaviour of net exports; however,
in line with the data these show a strong countercyclical tendency. The net foreign asset
position, shown as debt in the table, is closely matched by the model, both in terms of
volatility and correlation with output.
The eect of joining a monetary union, a form of a credible currency peg, is to give up
the exchange rate as an absorber of external shocks. The function of restoring equilibrium
in the markets for goods, labour, money, and foreign exhange, is therefore left to domestic
prices. Unsurprisingly, the real exhange rate volatility is much reduced, by over a half, with
the standard deviation falling from 4.27 to 1.86 percent. This is also illustrated in Figure
1, which shows the impulse response of e to a one standard deviation resource shock. With
much more muted response to disturbances, the sh catch shock no longer dominates the
others with regard to the cyclical property of e, which becomes essentially acyclical.
The volatilities of consumption and real wages show large reductions, while output and
employment become more volatile. The standard deviation of consumption is down from
3.1 to 1.6 percent, and of real wages down from 2.6 to 1.4 percent. This is largely due to a
been in operation in Iceland since 1914, when the Danish krone, to which the Icelandic krona was pegged,
was taken o the gold standard. For example, during the Bretton Woods era, 1944-71, but Iceland was
formally aligned with that system, the krona price per US dollar rose by a factor of 13.5.
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stabilized import price, which is an important component in the consumer price index.
10
Figures 2 and 3 display the impulse responses of total consumption and the real wage to a
domestic resource shock under the two exchange rate regimes. Output and employment are
slightly more volatile under monetary union than under oating. The standard deviation
of employment is up from 2.3 to 2.6 percent, and of output from 3.3 to 3.5 percent. This
clearly indicates the reduced ability of the economy to absorb external shocks, especially
when dominated by country specic real shocks, under monetary union. Figures 4 and 5,
showing the impulse responses of output and employment to a sh catch shock, reveal the
same pattern. This concern has been subject to much public and some scholarly debate in
Iceland over the years. [See e.g. Agnarsson et.al. (2000) for a summary on various criteria
against which country's (e.g. Iceland's) suitability to join the ECU might be tested.]
The switch from oating to monetary union also aects net exports, which move from
a countercyclical to a procyclical behaviour. Figure 6 shows the impulse reponse function
of net exports to a positive shock to 
D
. Under oating, the fall in e is so pronounced
that net exports in eect respond negatively. Under monetary union, with a much more
muted decline in e, these show a positive response. The foreign debt position is strongly
countercyclical under both regimes, but much smoother under monetary unuion. Again,
this owes largely to a stabilized real exchange rate. In either case, an increase in 
D
, say,
reduces e, which in turn lowers the stock of foreign debt to output. Under a oating rate,
this eect is more pronounced, as shown in Figure 7.
4.3 The issue of wage rigidity.
Ever since Mundell (1961), one of the critera for assessing whether or not an economy
can successfully adopt a regime of xed exhange rates, has been the issue of nominal
wage exibility. With exible nominal wages, an economy can absorb adverse shocks with
falling wages, in order to bring about the required decline in real wages. Under exible
exchange rates, the pressure on the nominal wage rate is less severe since an exchange rate
depreciation can provide the required adjustment in the real wage. This is indeed how
adverse shocks, whether rooted in sh catch or elsewhere, have been absorbed in Iceland
in the post-War era.
11
Evidently, it is in order to examine how the two exchange rate
regimes, a exible rate, and a currency peg, fare with respect to nominal wage stickiness.
10
Dene the consumer price index by P
c
= P
1
1+
1
E

1
1+
1
. Note that the logarithmic preferences over
c
D
and c
F
allow us to dene a composite consumer good whose price is given by P
c
. With a strongly
countercyclical E, as under oating, P
c
becomes countercyclical relative to P . In case of a positive shock to

D
, say, this has the eect of increasing both consumption and real wages dened in terms of the composite
consumption good.
11
See e.g. Einarsson and Magnusson (1985), and Agnarsson et.al. (2000).
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Table 3
Probabilty of W < 0, percent
 1.02 1.04 1.10
Floating 1.7 < 0:1 < 0:1
Monetary union 15.8 1.5 < 0:1
Table 3 reports the unconditional probability of a negative nominal wage change in any
given period, as predicted by the two model versions. The table lists cases for dierent
ination rate averages, ranging from 2 to 10 percent per annum.
12
A clearly dened
pattern is evident in the table. First, as expected, the strain on the nominal wage is more
severe under monetary union than under exible rates. For example, with a 2 percent
average ination, the probability of a negative wage change is 15.8 percent (about one
year in six) under monetary union, versus 1.7 percent under oating.
13
Second, declining
nominal wages become ever less likely with increased ination. With the average ination
rate rising to 4 percent, the probability of a nominal wage decline is down to 1.5 percent
under monetary union, and to under 0.1 percent with oating. A further increase of
average ination to 10 percent per annum reduces this probabilty to under 0.1 percent in
either regime. One should note that even in the `low' ination case of 2 %, the required
nominal wage rate decline is very modest on most occasions. For example, the probability
of encountering a fall in excess of one percent is 2.4 %, versus the 15.8 % attached to any
decline in nominal wages.
How do these results square with Icelandic data? During the period 1955-99, a nominal
wage decline is incident in one year only (1959). This would amount to one year in 50, or
about a 2 percent chance. Given that the reduction of nominal wages in 1959 was brought
about by a governmental decree, and with little record of how actully paid wages evolved
that year, there is a case for downplaying its relevance. Doing so would practically set the
probabilty to zero. The average ination rate, as measured by the private consumption
price deator, in this period was 18.4 percent, compared with a 10 percent rate shown
for the highest case in Table 3. With permanent ination in the double digits, the model
predicts the chance of observing a falling nominal wage rate being next to nil. In the
present day's environment of 2-3 % ination, this chance becomes, however, appreciable
12
We note that under monetary union, the permanent ination rate is determined by the foreign economy.
13
Since the model abstracts from growth, average ination and average nominal wage increases are
identical. Adding growth to the model would require a downward adjustment in the ination gures in
Table 3.
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in the case of a currency peg. Given the historical ination and exchange rate proles
of the Icelandic economy, it is dicult to predict how labour market statistics were to
behave under monetary union membership [the Lucas critique (1976) again, as Buiter
(2000) correctly notes.] In sum, it seems reasonable to argue that nothing in the data is
patently at variance with the model.
4.4 Welfare comparisons.
The functional forms for household utility employed in Section 3 imply concave pref-
erences over the two consumer goods in the model. Hence, any volatility in consumption
entails a welfare cost to the households. To compare the welfare cost of the two alternative
exchange rate regimes, we use the measure of compensating variation suggested by Lucas
(1987). The measure is based on the following question: By how much would the rep-
resentative household have to be compensated in terms of increased consumption, across
all states and periods, in order to leave it indierent between the regime in question and
perfectly smooth paths for c
D
and c
F
? Since both exchange rate regimes share the same
steady state equilibrium, we can conne our comparison to uctuations around that path.
Let (c
D
; c
F
;

l) denote the nonstochastic steady state values of the domestic consumer
good, the foreign consumer good, and leisure, respectively, and let fc
D
; c
F
; lg be the stochas-
tic equilibrium path for these variables from the exchange rate regime under consideration.
In brief, the welfare cost can be measured as:
E [U(c
D
; c
F
; l)] = U(c
D
; c
F
;

l)
where E is the unconditional expectation operator, and   1 is the compensation factor
that leaves the household indierent between the current policy regime, and uctuation-
free consumption and leisure paths. The compensation factor is obtained by the following
approximation:
   1 =
1
2
Var(c
D
) +

1
2
Var(c
F
)
where Var(z); z = c
d
; c
F
is the unconditional variance. Note that since utility is linear
in leisure, it does not appear in this measure. Table 4 presents the cyclical welfare costs
associated with the two exchange rate regimes, assuming an identical steady state rate of
ination (zero):
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Table 4
Welfare costs of Icelandic business cycles
Regime Welfare cost
Floating 0.13
Monetary union 0.03
According to Table 4, households would be willing to give up 0.13% of their non-
stochastic steady state consumption of the domestic and the imported good to eliminate
the business cycle under the regime of oating exchange rates.
14
Under monetary union,
they would surrender 0.03% for the same objective. This dierence comes from lower
volatility of both c
D
and c
F
under monetary union, owing to much smoother real exchange
rate, e. Thus, the latter dominates the former in the order of one tenth of a percentage
point, a small number compared to, say, welfare calculus exercises on the cost of ination,
but a qualititative indication nonetheless.
15
This narrow dierence between alternative
monetary regimes is paralleled in some other studies. For example, Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2001) nd several specications of an independent monetary policy to marginally
dominate `dollarization' in the case of the Mexican business cycle. The main reason for
`dollarization' being more costly is the assumption of nominal rigidities in the sector of non-
tradeables. The small welfare loss dierentials across policy regimes owe to the fact that
the welfare cost of business cycles, as measured in the representative agent framework, are
quite small, as highlighted by Lucas (1987).
16
14
Alternative monetary rules, such as constant growth rule, yields essentially the same result.
15
For a literature on the welfare cost of ination, see e.g. Cooley and Hansen (1989), Gomme (1993),
and Einarsson and Marquis (1999).
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Using post-War U.S. data on consumption, Lucas (1987) obtained very low estimates for the welfare
cost of business cycles. For example, with the degree of relative risk aversion in the 1-5 range, as widely
assumed in the RBC literature, the estimated welfare loss ranges from 0.008 to 0.042% of total consumption.
Attempts to evaluate the welfare costs of business cycles in a heterogeneous agents framework have come
up with mixed results, depending on how the idiosyncratic shocks relate to the aggregate shocks assumed
in the model. For example, assuming the expected duration of unemployment to be longer in a 'bad'
aggregate state than in a 'good' one, Krussel and Smith (1999) obtain somewhat larger (but still quite
small) welfare losses than those implied by the representative agent version of the same model.
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5. Conclusions
This paper sets out a simple two goods small open economy model with a domestic
resource shock as the driving force of the economy's business cycle. Two exchange rate
regimes, oating and a monetary union membership are compared with respect to business
cycle behaviour of selected macroeconomic variables. For simplicity, households engage
in investment decisions and rent capital and labour services to the rms. The households
have access to an international bond market, which provides a channel for savings (or debt)
in addition to capital and money holdings. With a oating exchange rate, the monetary
authority can pursue an independent monetary policy and, for that matter, insulate the
domestic ination from the ination rate undergoing in the rest of the world. Under this
regime, the exchange rate plays a vital role in absorbing macroeconomic shocks, bringing
about required adjustments in realitve prices, without necessiating any major response in
domestic prices. Under monetary union membership the home country does not adopt an
independent monetary policy, since the money stock passively adjusts to any changes in
the balance of payments vis-à-vis the foreign economy. The burden of absorbing shocks
falls entirely on domestic prices, so in order to bring about a given decline in real wages,
say, either nominal wages must fall or the goods price must rise, or both. In general, we
expect relative prices to be more responsive to real shocks under oating, while quantities,
such as output and employment, should show more stability.
The model was calibrated to recent data on the Icelandic economy and simulated under
the two alternative exchange rate regimes. Qualititavily, these general predictions show
up in the simulations. Under oating, which we take to be the closer approximation to
Iceland's post-War economic history, output and employment are smoother than under
currency peg. The real wage and the real exchange rate are, on the other hand, more
volatile under oating. So is total consumption, due to the fairly large share of the imported
good. In quantititive terms, the two model versions are not so far apart with respect to
output and employment. Consumption and relative prices, i.e. the real wage and the
real exchange rate, are about twice as volatile under oating than under monetary union
membership. Considering the welfare calculus of business cycles, that regime is marginally
Pareto superior to oating rates, due to more stable consumption. The concern that rigid
nominal wages might hamper the economy's ability to adjust to real shocks under currency
peg appears not to be a major problem according to the simulations. Clearly, imposing
nominal wage rigidity would increase the volatility of employment as well as output, but
unlikely by a substantial amount. Furthermore, the empirical relevance of such rigidity
remains unclear.
Finally, apart from wage and price rigidities, the presence of liquidity eects is an-
other example of a temporary friction [see e.g Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995), and
Fuerst (1992)] that might be important in dening the short term dynamics of the model.
Such addition would, however, call for a model calibration to data of higher than annual
20
frequency. Perhaps a topic worthy of future research.
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Table 1
Summary of Second Moments
Icelandic data
1961 - 99 1961 - 79 1980 - 99 1988 - 99
Variable stdev corr w/y stdev corr w/y stdev corr w/y stdev corr w/y
y 4.21 1.00 4.81 1.00 3.50 1.00 3.20 1.00
c 4.57 0.89 4.85 0.92 4.30 0.92 4.02 0.89
i 11.74 0.74 12.17 0.69 11.65 0.82 14.66 0.91
n 1.97 0.54 1.12 0.41 2.64 0.85 2.05 0.95
w
c
7.71 0.88 8.28 0.89 7.05 0.83 4.60 0.82
e 8.68 -0.75 11.54 -0.82 4.58 -0.68 3.22 -0.51
u=y 3.16 -0.20 3.82 -0.14 2.26 -0.47 2.27 -0.75
eb
0
=y 4.86 -0.77 4.99 -0.80 4.65 -0.65 3.01 -0.67
Notes: All data are HP-ltered, setting the smoothing parameter to 100. The series on
private consumption excludes expenditures on durables; investment includes business struc-
tures and equipment + residential, converted to real terms by the GDP implicit price
deator; w
c
denotes the real wage in terms of the composite consumption good; and u net
exports.
Data source: National Economic Institute
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Table 2
Summary of Second Moments
Icel. Data Model
1988-99 Floating Fixed
Variable stdev corr w/y stdev corr w/y stdev corr w/y
y 3.20 1.00 3.27 1.00 3.48 1.00
c 4.02 0.89 3.05 0.82 1.60 0.83
i 14.66 0.91 14.01 0.95 11.36 0.95
n 2.05 0.95 2.29 0.91 2.55 0.94
w
c
4.60 0.82 2.56 0.83 1.35 0.83
e 3.22 -0.51 4.27 -0.51 1.86 -0.03
u=y 2.27 -0.75 0.77 -0.81 0.69 0.36
eb
0
=y 3.01 -0.67 2.97 -0.73 1.25 -0.81
Notes: All data are HP-ltered, setting the smoothing parameter to 100.
w
c
denotes the real wage in terms of the composite consumption good;
u is net exports. Model data are based on averages across 100 simulations,
each of 20 years in length.
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